Was Quine right about subjunctive conditionals? by Rieger, Adam
 
 
 
 
 
Rieger, A. (2017) Was Quine right about subjunctive conditionals? Monist, 
100(2), pp. 180-193. (doi:10.1093/monist/onx003) 
  
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/133977/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 11 January 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk33640 
Author’s final version.  Published version to appear in The Monist.  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Was Quine right about subjunctive 
conditionals? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given his hostility to intensional locutions, it is not surprising that Quine was 
suspicious of the subjunctive conditional.  Although he admitted its usefulness as a heuristic 
device, in order to introduce dispositional terms, he held that it had no place in a finished 
scientific theory.  In this paper I argue in support of something like Quine’s position.  Many 
contemporary philosophers are unreflectively realist about subjunctives, regarding them as 
having objective truth values.  I contest this.  “Moderate realist” theorists, such as Lewis and 
Stalnaker, admit that subjunctives are context-relative and often indeterminate; I argue, 
using some examples from the contemporary literature on conditionals, that these features 
are deeper and more widespread than they think.  “Ultra realist” theories, which deny any 
indeterminacy, are not credible.  Hence subjunctives are unsuitable for certain purposes, in 
particular the description of mind-independent reality.  
 
 
A boy is going on his first date.  Worried that conversation will dry up, he 
asks his father for advice.  “Just stick to the three safe topics, son: food, 
family and philosophy.”  So the boy goes on the date. Conversation flags 
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but the boy remembers his father’s advice.  “Do you like potato pancakes?” 
he asks.  “No”, the girl replies.  There is an uncomfortable silence.  “Do you 
have a sister?” asks the boy.  “No”, the girl replies again.  Another 
uncomfortable silence.  So in desperation he tries philosophy: “If you had a 
sister, would she like potato pancakes?” 
Very old joke1 
 
1 Introduction: Quine on conditionals 
Quine was no great friend of subjunctive2 conditionals.  Given Quine’s hostility to 
non-extensional locutions, this is not surprising.3  Moreover, Quine gives specific examples 
to motivate pessimism as to the prospects of developing an account of them which would 
reveal them to be, after all, suitable for scientific discourse.  In Methods of Logic, Quine 
writes: 
                                                     
1  A version of the joke (“Well, if you had a brother do you think he’d like 
cheese?”) appears (Act II, Scene 2) in the play Our American Cousin, written in 1858 and 
famous as the play Lincoln was watching when he was assassinated.  
2  As is standard, I use 'subjunctive' and 'counterfactual' interchangeably for the 
class of conditionals under discussion, though as is well-known neither term is ideal, since 
there are specimens which are not in the subjunctive mood as well as ones with true 
antecedents.  
3  One might have expected Quine to recommend the impeccably extensional 
material conditional as an account of the indicative conditional.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, he seems to favour (eg Quine 1960, 226) an account according to which such a 
conditional has a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false.  On the other hand, he is 
quite explicit (1982, 22, 95) that statements of the form “All Fs are G” can be analysed 
perfectly as universally quantified material conditionals.  The position is uncomfortable: “All 
Fs are G” seems to entail all instances of “If a is an F, a is G”, but it will not on Quine’s 
account if a is not an F.  I have elsewhere (Rieger 2006, 2012, 2013) defended the viability of 
the material account, and will not discuss it further here.  
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It may be wondered, indeed, whether any really coherent theory of the 
contrafactual conditional is possible at all, particularly when trying to 
adjudicate between such examples as these: 
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian; 
If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French. 
(Quine 1982, 23) 
 
In Word and Object, Quine gives another pair of examples: 
The subjunctive conditional depends, like indirect quotation and more so, 
on a dramatic projection: we feign belief in the antecedent and see how convincing 
we then find the consequent.  What traits of the real world to suppose preserved in 
the feigned world of the contrary-to-fact antecedent can be guessed only from a 
sympathetic sense of the fabulist’s purpose in spinning his fable.  Thus consider the 
pair (Goodman’s, nearly enough) 
If Caesar were in command, he would use the atom bomb; 
If Caesar were in command, he would use catapults. 
We are likelier to hear the former, but only because that one is likelier to fit 
a lesson that a speaker would try to dramatize...the subjunctive conditional is an 
idiom for which we cannot hope to find a satisfactory general substitute in realistic 
terms… the subjunctive conditional has no place in an austere canonical notation 
for science…   
 (Quine 1960, 222, 225) 
Quine does allow for the scientific use of dispositional terms, such as fragile, 
introduced by a subjunctive conditional – thus, we call an object fragile if it would break if it 
were struck.4  But “each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism” (1974, 
10). Dispositional terms are merely convenient place-holders, ultimately to be replaced by 
categorical terms – molecular structure, or whatever – as science progresses.  Does this 
                                                     
4  More recent work has shown considerable problems with the simple analysis 
of dispositions in terms of subjunctives which Quine endorses, for example the issue of 
finkishness.  These complications need not concern us here. 
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mean that dispositional terms (and subjunctive conditionals) are eliminable?  No.  We can 
expect that each such term will, in time, be replaced by the appropriate categorical basis.  
But, since science is always in a state of development, we cannot expect there to be a time 
at which all such replacements will have occurred.  (To ignore this distinction would be to 
commit a quantifier-shift fallacy.)  Thus dispositional terms (and subjunctives) will always be 
with us, although the conditionals cannot be given a uniform analysis which would 
determine their truth conditions.  Though they have an invaluable heuristic use, they are 
not, ultimately, scientifically respectable.5  
Few would now endorse Quine’s pessimism.  A huge amount of theoretical work has 
been done on subjunctive conditionals, most famously by Lewis, who not only gave a theory 
of them but put them to work extensively, for example in his theory of causation.  
Counterfactuals are part of the daily discourse of philosophers.   
But are they really in good standing?  I suggest not.  The difficulties Quine raises have 
really been swept under the carpet, not solved.  And some of the extensive work on 
conditionals that has taken place in recent decades has revealed new problems.   
In the rest of this paper I shall proceed as follows.  I shall first review the mainstream 
theories of counterfactuals, those of Lewis and Stalnaker.  Both philosophers advance only a 
modest realist about their accounts, and admit openly that counterfactuals display context-
sensitivity, vagueness and indeterminacy.  They both think, however, that these can be 
overcome enough to justify their use.  If this is so, I argue, one should minimally expect to 
find a broad consensus on our intuitions concerning counterfactuals and some basic 
principles governing their logic.  But, on the contrary, the fundamentals are in disarray, as I 
shall show by considering some problems discussed in the recent literature.  Finally I shall 
briefly consider, but reject, some versions of realism more robust than those of Lewis and 
Stalnaker.   
 
2.  Lewis 
 The most influential writer on counterfactuals been Lewis.  His possible worlds 
analysis of their truth conditions, first given in (1973), has become close to orthodoxy in 
philosophy.  Famously, Lewis is an extreme realist about possible worlds: for him they are as 
                                                     
5  Quine’s views on dispositions are set out in most detail in The Roots of 
Reference (1974, §3). 
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concrete as the actual world.  Though few have followed him in this, the essential idea –  
roughly,6 that A > C7 is true iff in all the most similar8 worlds to the actual world where A is 
true, C is true – has become part of most philosophers' intellectual toolkit.  
 What, though, of the comparative similarity relation?  One might expect Lewis, in line 
with his realism, to hold that there are objective facts about similarity, to which we have 
some (though no doubt fallible) access.  This would give counterfactuals a firm foundation.  
But he writes as follows: 
Overall similarity consists of innumerable similarities and differences in innumerable 
respects of comparison, balanced against each other according to the relative 
importances we attach9 to those respects of comparison.  Insofar as these relative 
importances differ from one person to another, or differ from one occasion to 
another, or are indeterminate even for a single person on a single occasion, so far is 
comparative similarity indeterminate. 
(1973, 91) 
He quotes with approval Nelson Goodman: “Importance is a highly volatile matter, 
varying with every shift of context and interest, and quite incapable of supporting 
the fixed distinctions that philosophers seek to rest upon it.10”                   
(Lewis 1973, 92; the quotation is from Goodman 1970, 27) 
                                                     
6  Only roughly, because there may be no collection of possible worlds which is 
maximally similar to the actual world.  The subtlety is not important for current purposes.  
7  I use the symbol '>' to stand for the subjunctive conditional. 
8  Actually, it is somewhat misleading to think of a single comparative similarity 
relation defined on the universe of possible worlds, as this imports structure not present in 
Lewis's official semantics, for example, symmetry.  But as Lewis himself points out (1973, 
51), world j may look similar from the point of view of world i, yet i not look similar from the 
point of view of world j, since different things are important at each world.  That is, the 
similarity relation is liable to vary from world to world.  Few have noticed this and I ignore it 
here: see Goodman (2015a). 
9  My italics. 
10  My italics.  
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 Lewis says that the vagueness surrounding the comparative similarity relation is “the 
same sort of vagueness that arises if I say that Seattle resembles San Francisco more closely 
than it resembles Los Angeles” (92).  The answer depends on whether we attach more 
importance to architecture, climate, politics, and so on.  The case of possible worlds is likely 
to be, if anything, worse, since they are bigger and more complex than cities.  And the 
quotations from Lewis make clear that the problem is not simply one of context-sensitivity 
of the sort involved when “I am now hungry” has to have a time and person supplied in 
order to have a determinate truth condition.  It depends on the speaker’s intention, which 
may remain impenetrable however much is known about the context of utterance, and may 
indeed itself be indeterminate (perhaps the speaker has nothing in particular in mind).   
 All this, one might think, is grist to Quine's mill.  How we fill in what Quine above 
called the “traits of the real world to suppose preserved in the feigned world of the 
contrary-to-fact antecedent” is, on Lewis's account, at best a matter of intersubjective 
agreement, saturated in the particular local interests of humans. At worst it is entirely 
indeterminate.  Either way, it seems too flimsy for counterfactuals to carry much weight in 
either science or philosophy. 
 Lewis, however, thinks not.  His idea is that “the relative importances of respects of 
comparison, and thereby the comparative similarity of worlds, are at least roughly fixed” 
(93).  His approach is essentially supervaluational: he admits that there are many ways to 
make precise the vague similarity relation, but contends that in many cases, counterfactuals 
will have a determinate truth value in all “permissible” ways to do this, that is, ways 
consistent with context and normal usage.  He concedes, though, that “some sensitive 
counterfactuals are so vague as to be unsuitable for use in serious discourse” (94).  
 What reason does Lewis have for his optimism that, in a good proportion of cases, 
there will be enough intersubjective agreement that counterfactuals have determinate truth 
values, despite their sensitivity to how the vagueness of the similarity relation is resolved?  
The best evidence is surely that we do, in fact, often agree about their truth values.  But 
how much can rest on this observation? 
 For one thing, our intuitions about counterfactuals turn out to be quite confused.  I 
discuss below some examples from the literature which show up problems.  If we cannot 
agree, for example, about fundamental logical principles concerning counterfactuals, their 
suitability for scientific discourse is in doubt.  Secondly, even if we were in complete 
agreement, would that be enough?  The agreement could be the result of systematic 
confusion and prejudice, and there is no obvious way to test them.  Unless we have some 
account of their epistemology which gives some reason to think we are tracking genuine 
truth values, we are on flimsy ground here.  And the epistemology is notoriously hard to 
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provide, and only made worse by the introduction of possible worlds à la Lewis, since we are 
entirely isolated from them.    
In (1973) Lewis said little about how we make our judgments of similarity.  This led 
to some criticisms: for example in a famous review Fine (1975) suggested that “If Nixon had 
pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust” wrongly comes out false on 
Lewis's semantics, since a world in which, for example, the wiring of the button fails is more 
similar to the actual world than one in which the system functions as designed and the 
missiles are launched.  In response, Lewis (1979) gave his well-known recipe for determining 
similarity, justifying it by reference to the Nixon example: 
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law. 
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.  
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of 
law. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular 
fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.  
(Lewis 1979, 472) 
There is a great deal of literature on whether these are correct, how they can be 
improved, and indeed whether any such approach can work (see eg Tichy (1976), Edgington 
(1995, 257) and Bennett (2003, passim)).  Here I just want to consider the status of these 
rules.  Lewis is quite explicit that they are “reverse engineered” to fit our pre-existing 
intuitions about counterfactuals; he makes no attempt to give an independent argument in 
their favour: 
...we must use what we know about counterfactuals to find out about the 
appropriate similarity relation – not the other way around. 
  (467) 
He is also explicit that the similarity relation given by the four rules is only a “default” 
one and that different ways of resolving the vagueness in the similarity relation are 
appropriate in different contexts (457).  
Does Lewis’s theory show that Quine’s negative view of counterfactuals is mistaken?  
I think not.  Grant for the sake of argument that the theory is at least a reasonably 
successful account of our intuitions about counterfactuals, perhaps better than that.  
Nevertheless, in the absence of some account as to why our intuitions are a reliable guide to 
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an independently existing truth about these conditionals, which seems particularly unlikely 
to be forthcoming given Lewis’s emphasis on the multiple ways to resolve the vague 
similarity relation, what we seem to have been given is a piece of conceptual analysis in a 
narrow sense, of a concept saturated in interests local at least to the human race and likely 
particular societies and times.  It is perhaps analogous to accounts in applied ethics of 
concepts such as guilt and envy.  This is not to say such analyses are not valuable.  They may 
even be of considerable importance (for example in legal discussion).  But in carrying out 
such analyses we do not take ourselves to be uncovering fundamental truths of the 
universe, in the manner of a Quinean mature science, or naturalistic philosophy.   
This will carry over to any application of counterfactuals in analysing other notions.  
For example, Lewis produced a well-known account of causation in terms of counterfactual 
dependence.  He is quite open that “the vagueness of similarity does infect causation, and 
no correct analysis can deny it” (1974, 560).  But it is my impression that most working on 
counterfactual theories of causation take themselves to be exploring something that is more 
objective and real than Lewis’s foundations seem to allow. 
 
3 Stalnaker 
Another important theorist in the area is Robert Stalnaker.  In a series of papers 
starting with (1968), he developed a theory similar in outline to Lewis’s.  Salient differences 
are the absence of Lewis’s extreme realism about possible worlds; that A > C is true if C is 
true at the (single) closest world where A is true, rather than all the closest worlds as in 
Lewis’s theory; and that Stalnaker does not attempt to give a Lewis-style account of which 
the similarity relation, instead leaving his “selection function” which picks out the nearest 
world for a given world and context as unanalysed.   
Stalknaker does not take his semantic theory to be a full account of the truth 
conditions of conditionals, because it leaves open how the selection function is to behave.  
Somehow it depends on the context of utterance, the speaker’s intentions and the 
speaker’s linguistic community.  As already noted, he does not attempt to give details.  But 
he does make a number of claims about it.  He devotes a chapter of (1984) to the question 
of whether his theory is realist about counterfactuals, arguing that it is a “modest realist” 
one.  Like Lewis, his view is that at least sometimes, counterfactuals are determinately true 
or false, although “in application there is great potential for indeterminacy in the truth 
conditions for counterfactuals” (137).  His view of the Quine Bizet-Verdi pair is that both 
conditionals are indeterminate.  The selection function fails to pick out a unique world, as 
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there is a tie for similarity between worlds where both are Italian and both are French.  (In 
contrast, in Lewis’s semantics both conditionals are false.  I discuss this further below.)  
Overall, therefore, Stalnaker’s position is similar to Lewis’s in terms of his views on 
the determinacy of counterfactuals.  His chapter includes a brief discussion (147-153) of 
whether counterfactuals are of use in science, replying to writings by Mackie (1973) and van 
Fraassen (1980) suggesting that they are not.  Mackie argues that possible worlds 
approaches fail to provide truth conditions.  He gives the example “If you had struck that 
match it would not have lit, said of a wet match”.   He remarks that the conditional 
...will be true if the closest possible world in which the match is struck is one where it 
is struck while still wet, our causal laws being still in force.  But it is false if the closest 
possible world is one in which the striker, being knowledgeable and observant, 
would not strike a wet match, but takes care to dry this one before striking it.  
(89) 
 All we have been given, Mackie complains, is acceptability conditions, which depend 
on which worlds a speaker regards as closer – which seems little different from saying that it 
depends on which features of the world the speaker decides to retain in considering a 
situation where the antecedent is true. 
 Van Fraassen gives (1980, 116) an example similar in structure and draws a similar 
conclusion.  Whilst not claiming counterfactuals do not have truth conditions at all, he 
regards their context-sensitivity as making them unsuitable for science: 
The truth-value of a conditional depends in part on the context.  Science does not 
imply that the context is one way or another.  Therefore science does not imply the 
truth of any counterfactual – except in the limiting case of a conditional with the 
same truth-value in all contexts.   
(1980, 118) 
 In reply to Mackie, Stalnaker points out that although the counterfactual sentence 
may not have been given determinate truth conditions, this does not mean that a 
counterfactual proposition cannot have them. The context plays the role of determining 
which proposition is picked out by the sentence.  And against van Fraassen, he questions 
whether science is really as context-free as van Fraassen assumes.  Do not domains of 
quantification, for example, vary according to context? 
 It might be too strong to claim that any context dependence rules out a statement 
from being a legitimate part of science.  But, in the case of an indexical or an implicit domain 
of quantification, it will typically be possible to rephrase the original statement in a way that 
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is not-context dependent.  On the other hand since the range of what is held fixed and what 
is allowed to vary can be arbitrarily complicated, this will not in general be possible with 
counterfactuals.  Like Lewis, Stalnaker has failed to make a convincing case that the context-
dependency of counterfactuals does not rule them out of a respectable science. 
Lewis and Stalnaker are not the only philosophers to have produced theories of 
counterfactuals, though they have been  the most influential.  I shall not discuss any other 
theories in detail, but whatever the theory, similar questions will arise: what is kept fixed, 
and what allowed to vary, when the conditional is evaluated? 
    
4 Morgenbesser's coin 
One seeking to argue with Lewis and Stalknaker that the admitted vagueness and 
context-sensitivity of counterfactuals does not render them useless for serious purposes will 
surely welcome as a datum widespread agreement as to their truth values.  In the next 
sections I will discuss some problem cases in the recent literature on conditionals which 
suggests that on some fundamental matters this agreement will be hard to obtain. 
Slote (1978, fn 33) gives the following example, which he attributes to Sidney 
Morgenbesser.  A friend offers you good odds against heads coming up on the toss of an 
indeterministic coin.  You refuse the bet, the coin is tossed, and it does come up heads.  The 
problem concerns the counterfactual 
(M) If you had bet on heads, you would have won.  
A natural reaction is that (M) is true.  One can then test any given theory of 
counterfactuals against this.  For example, Lewis (1979, 472) cites the example to motivate 
that in his condition (4), approximate similarities in particular matters of fact should count 
for a small amount, rather than nothing.  Other cases, for example that given by Tichy 
(1976), seem to pull the other way; there is a literature on how to distinguish the cases, 
which I have no space to discuss here (see eg Shaffer (2004)).  
In introducing the example, Slote considers the alternative line of regarding (M) as 
false.  This is explicitly defended by Phillips (2007).  It is tempting to think, argues Phillips, 
that since all the causally relevant factors are the same in the counterfactual situation in 
which the bet is made, the outcome will be the same. But to argue like this is just to assume 
determinism, contra the stipulation of indeterminism in the example (47).   
What I want to suggest here is that there is no way to settle this dispute.  On the one 
hand, we are inclined to evaluate the counterfactual by noting that the bet does not affect 
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the coin toss, and hence keep the toss’s outcome fixed; this supports the truth of (M).  On 
the other hand, we are also inclined to evaluate counterfactuals by fixing the history of the 
world up to the moment where the truth of the antecedent forces a divergence, and then 
imagine how things develop; since the coin toss is indeterministic, (M) is not true.  The 
intuitions pull different ways, and cannot both be accommodated.  Neither way seems 
wrong, casting doubt on the existence of a robust “default” method of evaluating 
counterfactuals, of the sort described by Lewis.   
Similar remarks apply to the issue of conjunction conditionalization: does the truth of 
A and C entail the truth of A > C?  On the one hand, it seems that it must.  What better 
evidence could one have for A > C than that A actually turns out to be the case, and C as 
well? One might think this is the one case where one is really in a position to verify a 
subjunctive!  Both the Lewis and the Stalnaker semantics validate this, since for both of 
them the actual world is the unique closest A-world, should A be true in the actual world. 
On the other hand, suppose I am thinking of buying a ticket in a (large, 
indeterministic) lottery.  I optimistically announce “if I were to buy a ticket, it would win”.   
There is considerable pull to the thought that the subjunctive is simply false, even in the 
event that I do in fact buy a ticket and it does, in fact, win.    
We do not have clear intuitions about even as simple a matter as whether A & C 
entails A > C.  Nor is there any agreement on this amongst philosophers; see eg Walters and 
Williams (2013) for references.  I am inclined once again to conclude that the issue is 
indeterminate in a strong sense: there is no way to settle the dispute.  
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5 Truth conditions and the Gibbard phenomenon 
Alan Gibbard (1981, 231-2) gave a famous example (Sly Pete) which poses a problem 
for theories of indicative conditionals.11  Since the example has some unnecessary 
complications, I give a simpler example which maintains the essential structure.   
Suppose a crime was committed (by exactly one person) and that there are three 
suspects: the butler, the gardener, and the cook.  At the time of the crime, Holmes could see 
the gardener, gardening; he is therefore able to assert 
(H) If it wasn’t the butler, it was the cook. 
But at the same time, Watson saw the cook, cooking, and so can assert 
(W) If it wasn’t the butler, it was the gardener. 
Of course, it was the butler whodunit.  The puzzle is that (H) and (W) seem 
contradictory, yet neither Holmes nor Watson seems to be in any way mistaken.  This seems 
to leave three ways out: (i) the conditionals are material (in which case they are both true); 
(ii) the conditionals have truth conditions, but these must be radically relativized to the 
speaker’s epistemic states; and (iii) the conditionals do not have truth conditions.  Gibbard 
produced his example as a way for arguing for (iii).  He holds that indicative conditionals do 
not have truth conditions, whilst maintaining that counterfactual conditionals do.  
Edgington (1991, 206-7; 1995, 295; 1997) seems to have been the first to notice that 
the “Gibbard phenomenon” can apply to counterfactuals as well; in fact, that “for any 
contingent conditional, the world may be such that the Gibbard phenomenon can arise”.12  
If, after the case is closed, Watson asks Holmes “Why did you suspect the cook?”,  Holmes 
can felicitously reply: “Well, if it hadn’t been the butler, it would have been the cook”.  
Edgington draws the conclusion that there is no “ideal thing to think”; hence no objectivity 
and no truth value for in these cases.  (She thinks no conditionals with false antecedents 
                                                     
11  There are earlier examples in the literature which turn on the same feature, 
going back as far as Lewis Carroll; see Rieger (2013, §5).  
12  Van Fraassen (1980, 116-7) uses a Gibbard-like example (in fact, the one from 
Lewis Carroll) to argue for the essentially context-relative nature of conditionals; in reply, 
Stalnaker (1984, 151) complains that van Fraassen’s examples are indicative, not 
subjunctive.  But the argument carries over to the counterfactual case as well.  See also 
Swanson (2013) for discussion of Gibbard cases involving subjunctives.  
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have truth values; in non-Gibbard cases there can be an objective “right thing to think”, if 
there is an objective conditional probability.  But this doesn’t exist, she thinks, if the 
antecedent is ruled out by available facts.  Her wider case that subjunctives have no truth 
values, which I shall not consider here, is made in most detail in her 2008.) 
One might think that Edgington is too hasty in inferring from the facts ruling out the 
antecedent in the actual world to the conclusion that there is no objectivity in the 
counterfactual.  Suppose, for example, that the cook is a gentle soul who would never harm 
anyone, but the gardener shared the butler’s murderous intent, and indeed drew straws 
with him as to who should carry out the deed.  This seems to favour “if it hadn’t been the 
butler, it would have been the gardener” over the contrary counterfactual.13 
On the other hand, suppose instead that both the cook and the gardener are 
incapable of harming anyone, but the butler jointly planned the murder with the chauffeur 
(a brute, who was away on the fatal night, but was determined the victim should die).  
Holmes might then also assert with felicity “if it hadn’t been the butler, it would have been 
the chauffeur”.   
What seems right here is that there are sometimes two ways to hear a 
counterfactual, one an “epistemic” reading (in the sense of Gibbard 1981), in which it 
behaves much like an indicative, and one of the more usual “metaphysical” or “closeness” 
type (see for example Khoo (2015, §2.1)).  Thus Holmes’s conditional “if it hadn’t been the 
butler, if would have been the cook” is correct on an epistemic reading, but not on a 
metaphysical one. 
In any case, all this does not seem welcome news for those who favour scientific 
uses of counterfactuals, as it threatens to introduce a further axis of variation into the 
picture: for every conditional, we need to consider whether it might have be an epistemic 
reading that is intended.  Maybe there is a way to winnow out the epistemic uses, though it 
is not obvious how this is to be done.  And if Edgington is right, subjunctives are not truth-
apt at all.  She plays down the significance of this, since there can still be criteria of 
correctness – it is just that these are not truth and falsity.  But a considerable amount of 
work remains to be done, for example in finding surrogates for entailment, and in explaining 
how conditionals behave in compounds.  
 
                                                     
13  This is essentially the point made by Morton (1997) about a different example 
of Edgington’s. 
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6 Conditional Excluded Middle 
Another example of a fundamental, but disputed, principle is the following.  Do 
subjunctive conditionals obey the law of Conditional Excluded Middle, that is 
(CEM) (A > C) v (A > ¬C)? 
Exploring one’s intuitions with examples is inconclusive.  On the one hand, a 
sentence like “either if it had rained the match would have been cancelled, or if it had 
rained the match would not have been cancelled” looks true.  Perhaps, though, we hear it as 
“if it had rained, either match would have been cancelled or it would not”, and hence 
trivially true.  Natural language scope distinctions are notoriously confused in conditional 
contexts, as the case of negation shows.   
On the other hand, symmetric examples pull the other way.  Recall Quine’s example 
above: if Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, would they both have been French?  Or 
both Italian?  One hesitates to takes seriously the idea that exactly one of the 
counterfactuals is true, as appears to be required by CEM.  Perhaps Quine’s example leaves 
some small room for asymmetry,14 but this is easily remedied: for example, we can consider 
the subjunctives “if I had tossed the coin, it would have come up heads” v “tails”, said of an 
indeterministic coin.  
On Lewis’s semantics, CEM fails; for clearly if in some of the nearest A worlds, C is 
true, and some, C is false, neither A > C nor A > ¬ C is true.  Stalnaker’s position is more 
complicated.  Since the selection function picks out a single possible world, in which C will 
be either true or false, it seems that CEM is validated.  On the other hand, as noted above, 
Stalnaker admits that there is widespread indeterminacy in the selection function.  So for 
example he regards the truth values of both the Verdi/Bizet counterfactuals as 
indeterminate.  Does this mean that, after all, CEM fails?  It does not, because Stalnaker 
favours a supervaluational approach (1980).  On all ways of making determinate the 
indeterminate selection function, CEM is validated, and hence it comes out true in the 
semantics.  
One might be concerned that Stalnaker has kept CEM in letter but not in spirit.  After 
all, we have a situation where a disjunction is true while neither disjunct is.  To put the point 
another way, CEM is preserved, but not bivalence.  The worries here parallel those 
                                                     
14  Actually, Verdi’s birth (in 1813, near Parma) took place in the First French 
Empire, so it might be reasonable to argue that a situation in which they are both French is 
much nearer than one in which they are both Italian.  
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concerning supervaluations in their more familiar setting of ordinary vagueness; excluded 
middle is “supertrue”, but is supertruth really truth? 15  
There is a literature on CEM which I will not attempt to go into here.  But the dispute 
provides another example of a fundamental issue about subjunctives about which there is 
widespread disagreement.   
The situation seems worse, actually, than most examples of conceptual analysis.  For 
example, in epistemology, there is no agreement about how to analyse the notion of 
knowledge.  There does seem to be, though, a reasonable consensus about the intuitive 
verdict in each case.  Similarly in ethics, with the analysis of right action.  In these cases, the 
difficulty is fitting a theory which captures a reasonably robust collection of intuitions.  With 
counterfactuals, the intuitions are themselves highly disputed. 
I conclude, therefore, that the type of intersubjective agreement which Lewis and 
Stalnaker’s approach seems to require seems unlikely to be forthcoming.   
Perhaps, though, Lewis and Stalnaker’s realism is too moderate.  What if we reject all 
indeterminacy, and adopt a more hard-core realism? 
 
7 The ultra-realists 
Some, indeed have taken that route.  Hawthorne (2005) discusses the following 
problem for possible worlds accounts.  Consider a counterfactual such as “if I had dropped 
the plate it would have fallen to the floor”.  In the vast majority of worlds in which I drop the 
plate, it does indeed break.  But, because of quantum theory, there is a small but non-zero 
chance that the plate will instead fly off sideways.  And the worlds where this happens seem 
to be as close as the more common ones where the plate falls to the floor.  Hence the 
counterfactual comes out false on Lewis’s theory (and indeterminate on Stalknaker’s), 
despite looking intuitively true.16  Following a gloomy examination of the prospects of 
patching Lewis’s theory to get the desired result, Hawthorne continues: 
In closing I might mention that my own preference is to opt for a picture according 
to which, for any possibility that P, and for any world w, there is a unique closest 
world to w where P.   
                                                     
15  See Williamson (1994, Ch. 5). 
16  See Edgington (1995, 258), Bennett (2003, §96) and Hájek (2016). 
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(403) 
A related proposal is to be found in Schulz (2014).  Wishing to have the effect of 
having a single world picked out, but finding it implausible (1025) that there exists (in the 
style of Hawthorne or in the Stalnaker semantics) a unique world relevant to the evaluation 
of a counterfactual, Schulz gives a modification of Lewis’s semantics which replaces the 
universal quantifier with Hilbert’s epsilon-symbol.  This has the effect of picking out an 
arbitrary world from amongst those that are candidates.  The result, as with Hawthorne, is 
that the “dropped plate” counterfactual should be given a credence which is very high but 
falls short of 1, reflecting the fact that there is a minute probability that the chosen world 
will be one in which the plate flies off to the side.  
Schulz leaves open the metaphysics of the selection function, but leans towards 
endorsing a realist stance according to which “there simply is a distinguished but arbitrary 
selection function which supplies epsilon-terms with referents”.  
Both Hawthorne’s and Schulz’s approaches naturally endorse CEM, since either A > C 
or A > ¬C will be true, depending on whether C or ¬C is true in the unique selected world.  A 
paper by Jeremy Goodman (2015b) puts CEM centre-stage.  Goodman argues that CEM 
(which he takes to be true) entails various surprising metaphysical consequences, including 
the falsity of physicalism.  To give an idea (slightly simplified) of the argument:  Goodman 
considers a Max Black-style universe which consists only of two iron spheres rotating 
around each other.  From CEM, it follows, he argues, that only one of the spheres has the 
property of being the one that would have been heavier, had they had different masses.  
And this property is not a physical one, thus showing that physicalism is false.  Other 
heavyweight metaphysical theses which Goodman also derives are the identity of 
indiscernibles and the failure of various supervenience theses. 
All three authors thus have a robustly realistic attitude to counterfactuals, on which 
there is no indeterminacy and counterfactuals are “brutely” true.  How should we assess 
this?  One is tempted merely to offer an incredulous stare, but can one do better? 
Goodman’s argument is surely asking for a modus tollens.  If these drastic theses 
follow from taking such a robustly realistic view, it seems more plausible to doubt the 
premises than swallow the conclusion. 
Nor is the absence of indeterminacy in accord with common sense.  I take it that the 
reason the joke in the epigraph is funny is because the folk theory of counterfactuals makes 
it absurd that there should be a fact of the matter about the food preferences of a merely 
possible sibling.  Indeterminacy is deeply ingrained in our pre-theoretical views. 
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Speaking more theoretically, this extreme realism runs into the same kind of 
problems as epistemicism in the case of vagueness (of which it is at least a cousin – perhaps 
more, if one views the source of indeterminacy of counterfactuals as arising entirely from 
vagueness).  It is very hard to see what could make it the case that there is a determinate 
individual in some particular world whose food preferences determine the truth value of the 
conditional.  In the case of epistemicism about ordinary vagueness, there is at least the 
outline of an answer of what determines, say, the border between blue and green: that 
ultimately it depends on the usage and verdicts of speakers, though in some highly complex 
way that remains impenetrable to us.  But it does not seem credible that our linguistic 
practices fix a determinate truth value for every subjunctive conditional. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Are counterfactuals suitable for use in scientific purposes?  We can agree with Quine 
that they may have a heuristic purpose in introducing dispositional terms.  But can they play 
some more substantial role? If we can put aside the extreme realist position as incredible, 
the question is whether some more moderate realist position can be made to work.  Such a 
theory admits indeterminacy in general, but holds that it can be resolved in appropriate 
cases, or at least a high proportion of them. 
I do not claim to have established that this cannot be done.  But I hope to have 
shown that even the modest realism of Lewis and Stalnaker faces considerable obstacles.  In 
place of the approximate consensus which would give some support to their position, we 
find little agreement about subjunctives or their logic.  And the voluminous recent work on 
conditionals has made things worse rather than better.  
Clearly counterfactuals should not be eschewed completely.  As well as the Quinean 
heuristic use and their obvious use in informal reasoning, they will undoubtedly continue to 
have philosophical applications.  Analysing some notion in terms of counterfactuals may 
bring clarity. It may also give the appearance of objectivity, that some mind-independent 
truths are being uncovered.  But the objectivity is spurious.  That counterfactuals are 
essential in analysing a concept is, rather, a sign that it is intelligible only relative to human 
concerns.17   At best we can hope for intersubjective agreement; at worst even that will not 
be forthcoming. 
                                                     
17  For example, van Fraassen (1980, 118) draws this conclusion about the 
concept of explanation: it makes essential use of counterfactual language, and is therefore 
 18 
 
It seems, then, that Quine’s strictures on counterfactuals were broadly correct.    The 
right course of action with the subjunctive conditional is to “set it outside the systematic 
fabric of science”.1819   
 
Adam Rieger 
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